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Mead and the Emergence of the
Joint Intentional Self
Lawrence Cahoone
1 What is the core distinctiveness of Homo sapiens? Some of the most famous hypotheses
include  tool  use  and  tool  making,  language,  free  will  and  moral  agency,  self-
consciousness, mind itself, and reason or rational problem-solving. All these answers
are partly true. Recent cognitive science and study of primate evolution have generated
new proposals on this question. Philosophically, however, the account of human being
in terms of  cognitive  science and primate evolution threaten,  to  some,  a  reductive
naturalism.  The  American  philosophical  tradition,  along  with  process  philosophy,
characteristically presented versions of non-reductive naturalism. It so happens that
one, and only one, of the classical American pragmatists formulated both an account of
“emergence,” as a counter to reductionism, and a notion of the human difference on
which recent science has been converging. That is the Chicago philosopher of social
psychology George Herbert Mead. In what follows we will explore and extend Mead’s
contribution to two notions, emergence and what is now called “joint intentionality,”
employing the work of William C. Wimsatt, Michael Tomasello and Antonio Damasio.
We will see that Mead’s approach currently lies at the core of our evolving notion of
what is most distinctively human. 
 
I. Mead and Emergence
2 While, as noted, non-reductive naturalism was common among the classic American
thinkers, Mead was the only one explicitly to invoke the notion of emergence. Dewey,
Mead’s  close  friend  with  a  similar  naturalistic  philosophy,  might  appear  to  be
congenial, but explicitly rejected the concept in his correspondence.1 While some have
found the  idea  of  emergence  as  far  back  as  Kant’s  Critique  of  Judgment (Juarrero  &
Rubino 2008), it is usually traced to John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic (1843) and his
distinction of  “homeopathic”  (physical)  from “heteropathic”  (chemical)  laws,  which
G. H. Lewes termed these “resultant” and “emergent” respectively (Lewes 1875). The
Mead and the Emergence of the Joint Intentional Self
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-2 | 2019
1
term was not made famous until the 1920s by the British Emergentists, who published a
series of books during that decade – Samuel Alexander (1920), C. D. Broad (1925), and
Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1926) – along with their North American fellow travelers Roy
Wood Sellars (1922) and William Morton Wheeler (1928).
3 While less well-known among philosophers than Alexander and Broad, the ethologist
Lloyd Morgan was arguably the key figure (Blitz 1992). He adopted Lewes’ term in a
published  lecture  in  1913,  Spencer’s  Philosophy  of  Science,  before  Samuel  Alexander’s
Gifford lectures of 1916-18; Alexander later cited him as the source for his use of the
term (Blitz 1992: 114). Morgan argued that there are three different “modes” of relation
among natural phenomena, the physico-chemical (A), the organic (B), and the cognitive
(C). In each case the latter is asymmetrically dependent on the former but has “new
and distinctive properties which are not merely the algebraic sum of the component
things prior to synthesis. We may speak of them as constituents of the products at a
higher stage of relatedness […] the related things are progressively more complex […] I
do  not  say  more  real;  but  I  say  emphatically  as  real.”  (Morgan  1913:  28-9).  The
emergence of novelty is a kind of local “saltation” or nonlinear change (“jumpyness”).
It  is  not  clear  from  what  source  Mead  acquired  the  term,  but  given  that  he  had
reviewed an earlier book of Lloyd Morgan’s, he was most likely familiar with the latter’s
formulation (Mead 1894).
4 The  background  for  Mead’s  use  of  emergence  is  his  discussion  of  Whitehead  and
Bergson. Bergson had argued for the reality of process or development, calling it durée,
implying there are existents  in nature that  cannot  be analyzed as  ∆t  approaches 0
arbitrarily.  Whitehead accepted the  same point  exemplified  by  a  simple  transverse
wave – the wave cannot “exist” until one cycle is complete. Mead called this “passage.”
But the larger point was the relativity of physical measurement to “reference frames,”
for  Whitehead the “percipient  event” or  prehension of  a  system which dictates,  or
selects, a “consentient set” of reals in the environment. For Mead the percipient event
becomes an organismic act. 
5 In Mind, Self, and Society, emergence appears twice, in Mead’s discussing the relation of
the  I and  the  me (sections 25-28),  and  then  prominently  in  his  “Summary  and
Conclusion” (section 42). Mead understands emergence, like the British Emergentists,
as an alternative to mechanism (or reductionism) and vitalism, the later associated
with Bergson. Mead explicitly claims that two related but distinct principles constitute
the basis  of  his  approach to nature:  relativity and emergence.  What is  emergent is
“Anything that as a whole is more than the mere form of its parts has a nature that
belongs to it that is not to be found in the elements out of which it is made” (Mead
1934:  329).  He  uses  the  famous  chemical  example  of  the  properties  of  water  being
something  “over  and  above”  the  oxygen  and  hydrogen  atoms  which  make  it  up:
“Emergence  involves a  reorganization,  but  the  reorganization  brings  in  something
what was not there before. The first time oxygen and hydrogen come together, water
appears […].  emergence is a concept which recent philosophy has made much of…”
(Ibid.: 198). In Mind, Self, and Society he develops emergence primarily in relation to the
human self: the self is “emergent” (ibid.: 214). 
6 One of Mead’s clearest statements is from Philosophy of the Present: “The thread of the
physical  scientist  is  reduction and that  of  the biologist  is  production.  The biologist
cannot investigate until he has got a life process […] He must, however, have physical
means for this process and must therefore be a physicist as well […] If he reduces the
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reality of the life process to the means […] he becomes a mechanist. If the life process
appears  to  him  a  reality  that  has  emerged  out  of  the  physical  world  […]  he  is  a
teleologist. These two attitudes […] conflict […] only if on the one hand he […] refuses to
recognize that the process that he is investigating is a reality that has arisen, or if, on
the other hand, he states the physical and chemical things that enter into the process
solely  in  terms  of  the  process  […].”  (Mead  1932:  63-4).  For  Mead  there  is  only  a
“conflict” between accounts of the telic,  complex,  self-organizing behavior of living
organisms and the mechanical processes of physics (and perhaps chemistry), if one side
refuses to recognize the reality and necessity of the relations and processes employed
by the  other.  That  is,  if  the  reductionist  claims the  “emergent”  properties  are  not
“realities,”  or if  the “teleologist” claims the physico-chemical  phenomena are mere
“means” dictated by a higher end. 
7 Mead makes clear that emergence is intimately connected to his concept of “relativity.”
He writes, “When a form develops a capacity […] to deal with parts of the environment
[…]  it  has  to  this  degree  created  a  new  environment  for  itself.  The  ox  that  has  a
digestive organ capable of treating grass as a food adds a new food, and in adding this it
adds a new object […] The organism in a real sense is determinative of its environment
[…].” (Mead 1934: 215). The acorn is food, objectively, but in relation to the deer or
turkey, not the wolf.  Consciousness itself  arises from the interaction of a biological
form and an environment. In his 1927 lecture, “The Objective Reality of Perspectives,”
the notion of relativity is connected to “perspectivism” (Oliver 1938). Mead admires
Whitehead for the notion of nature as “an organization of perspectives” (Mead 1932:
173).  Each perspective  in  act  “stratifies”  nature,  “These stratifications are  not  only
there in nature but there are the only forms of nature that are there […]. But they are
there only in their relationship to percipient events or organisms.” (Ibid.: 179). This is
part of an even broader point. Mead’s student and editor Morris took Mead, as early as
1932, to be adopting an “objective relativism which inherently included the notion of
emergence”(Morris 1932: 252-3; my italics).  Objective relativism had been named by
Arthur Murphy, himself temporarily a colleague of Mead’s at Chicago, for a doctrine
found  in  Dewey  and  Whitehead  (Murphy  1927).  Mead  himself  ascribed  objective
relativism to Whitehead (Mead 1938: 524). Morris later argued that objective relativism
is the proper cosmology for pragmatism (Morris 1970: 135-6).
8 Mead sometimes used “sociality” for relativity, even applying it to inorganic systems
and their relations (Thomas 2016). “Sociality is the capacity of being several things at
once,”  he wrote (Mead 1932:  75).  Whenever something functions in,  and hence has
different properties in, more than one system or context, it is social. This even applies
to the increase of the mass of a moving object under special relativity (ibid.: 77). Morris
later wrote, “The new or novel properties which accrue to something when it enters a
new perspective (or system) Mead calls ‘emergent’ properties” (Morris 1970: 129). 
9 Emergence is thus the temporal, developmental cognate of relativity or sociality, for
“the emergence of novelty requires that objects be at once both in the old system and
that which arises in the new” (Mead 1932: l86). For Mead objective relativity holds in
general, but some temporal processes yield three different levels of analysis: reduction
to  components,  which were  present  in  the  past;  explanation in  terms of  purposes,
hence the future; and between the two, the present in which emergence is taking place.
Mead connected reductionism with the past – a summary of past conditions on the
present  –  and  vitalism  or  “teleology”  with  the  future,  but  “emergence”  with the
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present, being a combination of the two. The water molecule functions as such among
other  water  molecules,  with  distinctive  properties,  while  it  is  simultaneously  a
collection of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, and functions as such at that level. Hence,
“What for Aristotle is formal and final cause is coming back as an emergent” (Mead
1938: 641).
10 After  the  1920s  emergence  largely  disappeared  from  philosophical  and  scientific
conversation. Following an interregnum of several decades, it returned, in part due to
scientific work on complexity, nonlinear dynamics, and critical point phenomena. The
current literature on reduction and emergence can hardly be explored at  less than
book length (see Bedau & Humphrey 2008). The most interesting and useful analysis of
emergence comes from the American philosopher of biology, William Wimsatt, whose
work was influenced by hierarchy theorists like Herbert Simon (1962, 1969) and Stanley
Salthe (1985), the evolutionary epistemologist Donald Campbell (1974, 1988), and the
neuroscientist Roger Sperry (1976). Wimsatt argues that emergence and reduction are
not in conflict. A natural system may have some properties which are capable of a full
reductive explanation, and others that are not. Reducibility and emergence are matters
of degree. 
11 This is rooted in his analysis of reduction. For Wimsatt, “A reductive explanation of a
behavior or property of a system is one that shows it to be mechanistically explicable in
terms of the properties of and interactions among the parts of the system” (Wimsatt
2007: 275). The point of reduction is after all to simplify, to derive a system’s properties
from less  complex  systems and their  interaction  rules.  But  reduction  is  a  complex
strategy. In actual scientific practice, reduction explains: a) only some properties or
performances of  a  whole system; b)  on the basis  of  a  perspectival,  hence selective,
decomposition of the system, i.e. a particular way of cutting it into parts; c) by using an
idealized  model of  the  parts  and/or  their  interactions,  resting  on  or  employing
significant approximations. We may succeed in explaining one property of a system out
of a several properties we would like to explain, once we decompose the system in a
particular way and presuppose a model of the interactions among parts (e.g. thinking
of them as point-masses or spheres or oscillators or pumps). Inevitably, when we move
from nonliving systems to organisms, there are multiple possible decompositions of
each  system;  for  example,  decomposition  into  organ  systems,  cell  types,  electrical
pathways, circulatory systems, chemical concentrations, etc. (Wimsatt 1974).
12 According to Wimsatt, the endpoint of a complete reduction, which would justify the
claim that a system property or performance is “nothing but” its part properties, is
achieved to the extent that the system properties or performances are “aggregations”
of  part  properties  or  performances.  He specifies  four  conditions  of  aggregativity:
intersubstitutability or invariance of the system property under rearrangements of the
parts, so serial or aperiodic ordering does not play a role; qualitative similarity under
scaling, where addition or subtraction of parts leaves the property only quantitatively
changed, bigger or smaller but with the same properties; re-aggregativity, or invariance
of the system property under decomposition and re-composition, so it will be the same
if we take it apart and rebuild it; and linearity, where change in output is proportional
to change in input, with no feedback, either cooperative amplification or inhibitory
damping (Wimsatt 2000). Only when all these hold can we say the system property is
“nothing  but”  the  aggregation  of  decomposed  parts  and  their  interaction  rules,  in
Mead and the Emergence of the Joint Intentional Self
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-2 | 2019
4
effect, a linear sum or product of part-properties that have minimal interaction and
can be treated as isolable. 
13 But this is rare. Mass is one of the few properties of physical systems which is just the
aggregation of the same property of the components (e.g. my mass equals the sum of
the mass of all my chemical substances which equals the sum of the mass of all my
atoms, etc). Volume is not, for in some chemical reactions volume changes. Wimsatt
makes the suggestion that aggregativity tracks the conservation laws of physics, that
the properties subject to conservation laws – mass, energy, charge, spin – are those
whose values are indeed invariant in all interactions. This shows how fundamental, and
yet  how  narrow,  the  band  of  aggregative  properties  is.  That  is:  reduction  explains
something about almost everything, but everything about almost nothing. When and where
reduction  works,  it is  tremendously  simplifying,  and  generates  the  most  context-
independent entification. So we understandably keep trying to decompose systems and
idealize  their  components’  interactions  so  as  to  yield  workable  reductions,
“decomposing,  cutting,  pasting,  and  adjusting  […]”  (Wimsatt  2007:  286-7).  There  is
nothing wrong with this, as long as we recognize its merely partial success most of the
time. 
14 Emergence can then simply be defined as non-aggregativity. It occurs when a reductive
explanation,  which  explains  a  process,  structure,  or  system  at  level  N  as a
reconstruction of a causal sequence of entities, processes, and/or forces of level N-1,
without  employing reference  to  processes,  structures,  and entities  at  the  N or  N+1
levels, is inadequate. Then we require recourse to “systemic” explanations, where the
explanans is at the same level as the explanandum (system N) – i.e. explaining the dent
in the  fender  by the impact  of  the  other  car  –  or  “functional”  explanations  of  N’s
properties by reference to encompassing or higher level N+1 systems or processes. The
desideratum is to what extent the structure/processes of system N are caused by more
or less isolable, environmentally-uninfluenced properties of N’s parts and their two-
body interactions. If so, we have a more complete reduction. If not, if the contribution
of the part-properties and their simple interactions to the whole is itself influenced by
the whole, the whole is to that degree non-aggregative. 
15 Wimsatt does not hesitate to draw ontological  conclusions.  Nature exhibits levels.  A
level is a “hierarchical division of stuff (paradigmatically but not necessarily material
stuff) organized by part-whole relations, in which wholes at one level function as parts
at  the  next  (and  all  higher)  levels”  (Wimsatt  2007:  201).  It  is  a  “local maxima  of
regularity and predictability in the phase space of different modes or organization of
matter”  (ibid.:  249).  The  range  of  entities  with  which  a  system  interacts  is  a  non-
arbitrary and informative fact about that entity. Scale or size is “a robust indicator for
many  […]  kinds  of  causal  interactions.”  Entities  are  generally  at  levels;  levels  are
“where the entities are.”
16 Multiple-realizability of higher-level properties, hence the dynamic autonomy of those
higher levels, is “a general fact of nature” (ibid.: 217). While the macro-properties of a
system must be sensitive to certain kinds of micro-changes, “it  is crucial that most
differences [at the micro-level] do not have significant [macro-level] effects most of the
time” (ibid.: 218). What happens to a system does not necessarily happen to its parts,
nor  vice  versa.  My cells  will  die  shortly  after  I  do,  but  not  my molecules,  because
molecules are not alive – nothing less than a cell lives. The atoms of the water in the
pond do not freeze when the pond water freezes, since freezing is a phase change of the
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relations among molecules. This has a simple but powerful consequence: there cannot
be purely  micro-level  explanations  for  most  stable  macro-level  properties.  Wimsatt
summarizes,
levels  of  organization are a deep,  non-arbitrary,  and extremely important feature of  the
ontological architecture of our natural world, and almost certainly of any world that could
produce,  and  be  inhabited  or  understood  by,  intelligent  beings […]  (Ibid.:  203-4; his
emphasis)
17 Mead’s conception of emergence was far less complex than this analysis. Nevertheless,
not only was he unique among the Americans in adopting emergence, his conception
was prophetic in some ways. One can see in Mead a recognition that is continuous with
Wimsatt’s work: “emergent evolution” must combine the mechanical or reductive, the
“lower” stratum on which the system in question asymmetrically depends,  and the
functional,  for  Mead  “teleological,”  stratum.  Emergence  does  not  mean  an
abandonment of the mechanical. A complex system that is “more than the sum of its
parts,” hence only partly but not fully explained by reduction – i.e. aggregation – is one
that functions at multiple levels of scale where there are distinct properties at these
levels. 
 
II. Mead and the Joint Intentional Self
18 Certainly Mead’s most famous innovation was the concept of “significant gesture” from
Mind, Self,  and Society.  Gestures are the communicative behaviors that many animals
produce to enhance the process of “mutual adjustment.” One organism responds to
another’s  gestural  act  by  a  movement  that  changes  the  situation communicatively:
Fido,  rather  than biting  Rover,  barks  or  growls;  rather  than being  attacked,  Rover
shows a submissive posture. The gesture is the initial phase of an act (i.e.  growling
before biting) which functions to call out a response on the part of another organism
(Mead 1934: 44). But, Mead argued, humans alone engage in significant gesture, gestures
that functions as signs.  For Mead a significant gesture means or  stands  for the later
phase of the act. This grants the gesture objective status for others and the gesturer.
Mead insists that only humans can treat natural events as signs. Imagine I walk my dog
through the woods, and we come upon a bear’s paw print. The dog smells it, feels fear,
and buries its nose in the print. In effect he is afraid of the footprint. I, seeing the print,
feel fear too. But I respond by ignoring the print and scanning the horizon, because for
me the print functions as a sign of something other than itself. 
19 Mead argues that what allows humans to treat a gesture as sign is that the gesturer
responds to its own gesture from the perspective of the recipient. She or he does so
“implicitly” – we might say, “out of gear” – rather than explicitly. I can only send you a
sign if I implicitly respond to the sign just as I expect you to respond explicitly, which I
can only do that if I know what it is to experience the sign from your point of view. In
taking the other’s perspective the gesturer must regard herself as an object from the
viewpoint, or attitude, of the other. Mead writes, “Gestures become significant symbols
when they implicitly arouse in an individual making them the same response which
they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to arouse, in other individuals, the individuals
to whom they are addressed;  and in all  conversations of  gestures within the social
process […] the individual’s consciousness of the content and flow of meaning involved
depends upon his thus taking the attitude of the other toward his own gestures” (ibid.:
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47). Taking the perspective of others then allows humans to play, and engage in games,
in which each player must be capable of seeing events from the viewpoint of other
players and their roles. You cannot be a shortstop unless you can regard a base hit from
the perspectives of nine other players at more or less the same instant. In fact,  for
Mead thinking itself is as an inner conversation among the perspectives internalized
from social interaction. Human mind just is the activities of significant gesture. 
20 The result is the “self,” which for Mead emerges from a process of interaction between
the  me,  the  sum  of  the  individual’s  social  roles,  and  the  I,  the  organism’s  unique
spontaneous reaction to the me. For Mead, “The others and the self arise in the social
act together” (Mead 1932: 178). Mead eventually derives the notions of rationality and
morality  from  this  intrinsic  sociality  of  the  human  individual,  by  which  what  is
“objectively” valid in a rational discussion, and what moral judgments or rules stand as
“objectively” valid, are judgments from the perspective of the generalized other. 
21 The  major  limitation  on  Mead’s  analysis  by  the  standards  of  today’s  comparative
psychology is that he held a restrictive notion of “mind.” Mead was a naturalist and
familiar with the ethology of the time; he discussed nonhuman animals, particularly
the  eusocial  insects,  to  distinguish  their  physiologically  fixed  social  roles  from the
human case (Nungesser 2016).  However, like many other philosophers of his era he
restricted mind to humanity. For Mead the following concepts are linked: significant
gesture,  signs,  mind,  intelligence,  self,  self-consciousness,  meanings,  language.  No
creature has one of these without the others. Hence for Mead there is no nonhuman
mind. 
22 But in other respects, Mead’s analysis is very contemporary. An important theme in
recent comparative psychology, cognitive science, and primatology is that humans are
uniquely social or “prosocial,” far more so then even our great ape relatives. (Franz De
Waal 1996; Peter Hobson 2004; Thomas Suddendorf 2013; Michael Tomasello 2014, 2016;
Raimo Tuomela 2010; Edward O. Wilson 2013). The eusocial insects are highly social, in
a sense more so than ourselves, but they are almost clones, born of a common queen.
Human beings are the only animal on Earth that exists in complex societies but are not
kin.
23 “Mind-reading” is the name given to the ability of one animal to recognize the mental
intentions  of  another  (Suddendorf  2013).  The  comparative  psychologist  Michael
Tomasello has argued that the human capacity for mind-reading is far greater than
that of other primates. So great, in fact, that he roots it in the phenomenon of joint
intentionality, when multiple agents actually share a mental state (Tomasello 2014). Say
a human caregiver introduces an initially distressing object –a wind-up monkey toy –
to  a  year-old  infant.  Initially  the  child  looks  at  the  toy  in  fear,  then  looks  at  the
caretaker. She smiles, amusedly handling the toy, exhibiting her attitude of enjoyment
rather than fear. The child then smiles and handles the toy itself. Tomasello suggests it
is not merely that the child is imitating the behavior of the mother; the object has
become acceptable by virtue of the child’s taking up the caregiver’s attitude toward the
object, which of course requires first that the child “read” the attitude of the caretaker.
Peter  Hobson  calls  this  early  identification  and  transference  of  attitudes  the
“Copernican Revolution” of human mind (Hobson 2004: 73). 
24 The human child is hard-wired to be motivated to engage in such mind-reading and in
joint collaborative activities. While nonhuman primates are capable of a limited form of
attributing perception or knowledge and goals  to another,  the full  mind-reading of
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shared intentionality is uniquely human. Incorporating and retaining the perspectives
of  others  complexifies  the  self  and  the  perspectives  it  can  take.  Adopting  others’
attitudes  sets  up  different  optional  perspectives  for  the  individual  mind.  As  Mary
Warnock suggested that “the possibility of taking up different perspectives is essential
[…]  to  having  a  thought  about  something”  (Warnock  1978:  171).  Thought  is  a
conversation among socially acquired and imaginatively recombined perspectives. This
was  exactly  Mead’s  claim.  There  seems  to  be  a kind  of  social  relating,  with  both
cognitive and affective features, that forms a key difference between ourselves and our
closest living relatives. It appears the human mind does not merely involve or require
communication in  the coordination of  activity,  but  is  itself  communicative.  My mind
represents what others say and think, I incorporate and think from their perspectives,
take  on their  roles,  converse  with  them internally,  exchange signs  with  them that
arouse the same response in myself, a self which emerges from out of my relations to
them. The others are in my head, like it or not. 
25 This convergence of Mead and Tomasello has already been noted by Frithjoff Nungesser
(Nungesser  2016).  In  what  follows  we  will  try  to  extend  the  notion  of  joint
intentionality  and  relate  it  to  other  features  of  human  evolution.  Tomasello
hypothesized two epochal achievements after the early evolution of the genus Homo
that  eventually  led  to  us  (Tomasello  2014,  2016).  First  there  is  joint  intentionality,
which generates a “second-person intentionality” between infant and caregiver and
between partners in “obligate collaborative foraging.” He naturally presumes language
arises on the basis of  joint intentionality.  Then later “collective intentionality,” the
ability  to  take  the  perspective  of  the  tribe  as  a  whole,  arises  with  its  “objective”
depiction of reality and social goals through cultural practices and artifacts. We will
suggest some amendments to his analysis. 
 
II.1. Joint Intentionality
26 Imagine a baseball diamond with X at home plate, I at first base, W (for We) at second
base, and Y (for You) at third base. X is some object, for I, Y (you), and perhaps W(e)
(Figure One). But we may add a step. Halfway from X to I, there is A; halfway from X to
Y is B. A and 
B are two statuses or functions of X, from the viewpoint of I and Y, respectively. X
serves as A for I and B for You, while remaining X. For the ability to recognize an object
from another’s perspective is tantamount to recognizing that a single object can have
two or more functions or statuses, while remaining the same object – in Mead’s terms,
the ability “to be several things at once.” The toy was fearful and is now enjoyable; the
stick serves as a bird in the hand of one child at play, a spear in the hand of another.
The  same stone  can  serve  as  a  hammer  for  you  or  a  cutting  tool  for  me.  In  joint
intentionality we acquire the ability to cognize the fact that a thing can have multiple
functions in different relations while remaining itself. X can function as A and/or B,
serially or simultaneously, in different relations, and still be X.
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27 This is equivalent to saying that X stands for or means A to I and B to you. That is the
sign relation.  A  sign is  a  human production which objectively  (publicly)  stands  for
something to some set of organisms capable of taking the perspective of a conspecific.
If I and you can recognize that X can function differently for different conspecifics, can
change what it stands for or functions to do – when I adopt your perspective or you
mine – then I and you have acquired the concept of meaning. X can have two different
meanings, or functions, while remaining X. For Mead, I’s ability to alternate between its
own relation to X and You’s relation to X is what allows X to be a significant gesture or
sign, with potential meanings A and B. 
28 Tomasello  points  out  that  the  sophisticated  problem-solving  of  many  nonhuman
animals, particularly primates, shows they do understand cause-effect relations. But
what they do not understand is  causal  intermediaries,  causal  processes with multiple
steps. some of which can be replaced by others (Tomasello 2014). The great apes, who
are capable of remarkable feats of problem solving, do not understand that the relation
of antecedent and consequent, or stimulus and response, may entail an intermediate
causative  force  or  agent  intention,  hence  the  same result  might  be  preceded  by  a
variety of antecedents. 
29 Imagine for the moment that in Figure One, on the path from X to I, that I is not a
person, but an event, in this case, a goal we want to achieve, and likewise Y. Think of X
as  fulfilling  or  functioning  in  role  A,  hence  leading  to  I,  and  as  B  leading  to  Y.
Recognizing that A, a function of X, is distinct from X makes it possible to substitute
other acts or steps or things for X. The hole needs to be dug. Yesterday we used a flat
rock, but if the rock is not here today, we might use a spear. Production processes, like
making a hand axe, require a necessary ordering of steps resulting in an end. Different
but functionally equivalent causal intermediaries can be substituted for X on the way to
I if they do A. Also, while X can get to I by way of A, a functional equivalent of A (D, E,
etc.)  will  do  as  well.  The  same  is  true  of  social  members  who  switch  roles  in
collaborative endeavors – the last time you drove the prey, I speared it; this time I will
drive the prey, you kill it. Causal, temporal processes can now be understood as structure of
relations  which  have  a  logic  into  which  the  entities  fit. This  also  can be  applied to  the
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construction of a whole from parts. The patch of fox fur can contribute to a dwelling or
to a piece of clothing or perhaps a bag for carrying. 
30 Suddendorf  points  out  the  importance  of  cognitive  “nesting”  as a  uniquely  human
ability  (Suddendorf  2013).  I  can believe  “A lied  to  B.”  But  also,  I  can recognize  “C
believes A lied to B,” or even, “D knows that C believes A lied to B.” That is nesting or
embedding. But this can be applied to all manner of scenarios. Imagine a scenario for
future action in which X, now a deer, plays a role as the object of a possible action,
“Today I will hunt X.” Then imagine a modification of the situation: “You could help (I
hunt X)].” Then new information comes along, “D says a hog would be better than [You
helping (I hunt X)].” Hence on the basis of the newest (leftmost) “nesting,” I decide to
switch the ultimate goal: replace X with H, a wild hog. 
31 Causal intermediaries, whole-part substitution, and cognitive nesting are an implicit
use of logic.  I  do not mean the literate study of logic in Greek, Indian, and Chinese
civilization in the first millennium BCE, but the recognition of relations, processes, and
possibilities  which  cohere  and  those  which  contradict.  Collaboration  in  hunting  or
gathering, and in the manufacture of tools, or making, would have to exhibit such logic.
That X must precede Y, and Y precede Z, hence X does in fact precede Z; that X must be
the first step in a process, followed by Y, and then Z, so X is the basis of Z; that one
layer of clothing or fur or one type of cut into a stone for the process of making a hand
axe, is the basis for step Y, and then Z; that a whole event or entity can have substitute
parts while remaining the same kind of thing, or retaining the same social function.
That is to say: the switching of perspectives, which Mead diagnosed and current joint
intentionality presupposes, allows the distinction between what X is for you and what
it is for me, which X remains identifiable and re-identifiable as X. That is in effect to
distinguish X from X’s various possible meanings or functions. This allows the handling
of possibilities, which are essential to human mind. For Mead “The [human] mind holds
on to […] different possibilities of response […] and it is [this] ability to hold them there
that constitutes his mind” (Mead 1934: 135).
32 This is connected to another important human difference, time travelling, or mentally
moving out  of  the  present  (Suddendorf  2013).  There  are  many creatures  who time
travel to some extent. Nonhumans clearly have memory, and learn. The most obvious
form of memory is procedural, which is the remembering how to do something. There
is also what called “semantic” memory, which means remembering a fact or state of
affairs. That an animal can find an acorn, or some other treat, that it once hid or saw
hidden, and find it again, is semantic memory. All this can be produced by association.
Another animal  or  place that  produced danger or fear at  an earlier  time,  and now
produces fear again, is an association of fear with the animal or place. But to be able to
recall  a  series  of  events  constituting  an episode,  a  narrative,  is  a  different  matter.
Humans have far more episodic memory than our closest nonhuman relatives. 
33 Time travel  is  clearly  related to  some of  the  abilities  described above.  It  would be
difficult to imagine episodic memory without a complex analysis of causal relations.
Collaborating humans must be able to plan, hence project possible cooperative acts, but
they cannot improve on their performance unless they can discuss long sequences of
past  actions,  particularly after a collaborative project  has failed.  The human ability
both  to  remember  a  detailed  set  of  episodes  from  the  past,  and  to  anticipate
possibilities in the future, hence to plan, seems unique. And both seem crucial to the
possession of a self. 
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34 There  is  much  disagreement  about  whether  nonhumans  –  particularly  the  most
cognitively  gifted  nonhumans,  like  great  apes,  cetaceans,  elephants,  canines,  and
corvids  –  have  “selves.”  Animals  are  clearly  biological  agents.  By  any  reasonable
definition  of  mind  and  consciousness,  many  have  both,  as  well  as  characteristic
behaviors  and dispositions  which one could term “personality.”  But  self  is  another
matter.”2 It  is  quite true that  some nonhumans have passed the famous “mark” or
mirror self-recognition test. In these tests, experimenters place a mark, sometimes of a
tasty material, on the forehead of an animal, then allow it to see its image in a mirror,
to see if it will touch its own forehead and maybe eat the treat. Elephants, dolphins, and
magpies have occasionally passed the test, but only the great apes consistently pass.
However even then more than half of them fail (Suddendorf 2013 : 54). I suggest that
even success on the mark test does not by itself indicate possession of a self. Certainly it
indicates a recognition of one’s own body, an important cognitive achievement, but one
more akin to causal reasoning, as in recognizing that the movements of the mirror
image are causally related to one’s own proprioceptions. 
35 Here we can turn to the distinction made by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio between
“extended”  or  “autobiographical  self-consciousness”  and  “core  consciousness”
(Damasio  2000).  Core  consciousness  is  the  basic  form  of  real-time,  waking  present
awareness common to humans and many other animals. It functions to track somatic
state in relation to environmental changes, enabling learning and complex behavior
control. But extended or autobiographical consciousness, found in healthy humans,
reads the results of core consciousness as owned by an historical agent or self, a narration
of personal identity. This requires episodic memory – the memory of sequences of past
events,  stories,  if  you will  –  and imagination of future possibilities.  It  is  this which
humans usually call consciousness, in Damasio’s terms, the “self-in-the-act-of-
knowing.”  It  can  be  turned  off  by  illness,  for  example  in  some  kinds  of  epileptic
seizures, while core consciousness is retained. Mead would add that this comes from
some sophisticated application of what is gained from joint intentionality, combined
with episodic memory, for it is bound up with viewing the self as an other while remaining
the  self.  The  self  of  human self-consciousness  is  socially  acquired.  My point  is  that
Damasio’s notion can be combined with Mead’s. Self-consciousness requires both the
ability  to  take the perspective of  the other  (and the we)  on the self,  and the time
travelling ability to narrate a personal history. Damasio’s analysis presses Mead’s case
further. 
36 Now we can pass to two other great achievements that are unique to humans, but very
likely rooted in joint intentionality. 
 
II.2. Language
37 The most important kinds of signs in human evolution must be language, both manual
and  verbal.  Human  language  is  unique.  No  other  living  species  has  anything
comparable. It is true that in recent decades humans have taught a remarkable amount
of American sign language or an equivalent to certain great apes (Suddendorf 2013: 85).
This has to mean that Mead was wrong to imagine that no nonhumans can acquire
significant gesture of any kind. However, we must note that none of this happens in the
wild,  only  through  intensive  human  training.  That  is,  such  linguistic  events  only
happen in human society. 
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38 The question of whether language is uniquely human is actually the question of which
features of language are uniquely human. The current answer must still be “quite a
few.” But what matters for us in the present context is, what mental abilities does the
uniquely  human  version  of  language  use  signify?  Philosophically  speaking,  human
language provides a means by which meanings can be treated and manipulated as objects.
Meanings may be recognized in joint intentionality, but language provides a device for
handling  them.  Meaning  manipulation  allows  us  to  do  something  remarkable,  to
objectify and communicate about what is non-actual,  that is,  are in the past or the
future. Language allows us to communicate about the actual states and things through,
or in the context of, the non-actual or non-present possibilities. To say “a baseball” is
to refer to any one of a huge number of objects that have existed in present, past and
future. All human words other than proper nouns and all linguistic statements have
meaning which involves universals, generalities, hence cognized possibilities. Meanings
can be of what is not actual, of what is past or what is possible in the future. Language
allows  us,  as  Mead  pointed  out,  to  “hold”  such  meanings  in  the  mind,  as  well  as
exchange them. Cognitive nesting,  for example,  would seem impossible without the
unique  recursivity of  human  language,  the  ability  to  generate  an  indefinitely  large
number  of  utterances  by  adding  and  recombining  phrases.  Reasoning  about  these
nested possibilities  of  collaboration requires  sophisticated verbal  language,  a  set  of
signs that can be used to hold and “handle” these contextualized possibilities. Mead
explains that language provides a “fifth dimension” for action, a “field of indication
and reference” (Mead 1938: 135-6). Meanings emerge in human linguistic interaction.
39 There also seems to be an affective side to language competence. To see it, we can turn
from the distant to the recent past for a remarkable example: the famous passage from
Helen Keller’s autobiography when the blind, deaf and speechless nearly-seven-year
old suddenly acquires language. The passage is long, but incomparable.
The morning after my teacher came she led me into her room and gave me a doll. [
…].  Miss Sullivan slowly spelled into my hand the word “d-o-l-l.” I  was at  once
interested in this finger play and tried to imitate it […] I did not know that I was
spelling a word […] I was simply making my fingers go in monkey-like imitation […
]. One day, while I was playing with my new doll, Miss Sullivan put my big rag doll
into my lap also, spelled “d-o-l-l” and tried to make me understand that “d-o-l-l”
applied to both. Earlier in the day we had had a tussle over the words “m-u-g” and “
w-a-t-e-r.” Miss Sullivan had tried to impress it upon me that “m-u-g” is mug and
that “w-a-t-e-r” is  water […].  I  became impatient at  her repeated attempts and,
seizing  the  new doll,  I  dashed it  upon the  floor […]  Neither  sorrow nor  regret
followed my passionate outburst […] In the still, dark world in which I lived there
was no strong sentiment or tenderness […] We walked down the path to the well-
house […] Some one was drawing water and my teacher placed my hand under the
spout. As the cool stream gushed over one hand she spelled into the other the word
water, first slowly, then rapidly. I stood still, my whole attention fixed upon the
motions  of  her  fingers.  Suddenly  I  felt  a  misty  consciousness  as  of  something
forgotten […] and somehow the mystery of language was revealed to me. I knew
then that “w-a-t-e-r” meant the wonderful cool something that was flowing over
my hand. That living word awakened my soul, gave it light, hope, joy, set it free! […]
Everything had a name, and each name gave birth to a new thought. As we returned
to the house every object which I  touched seemed to quiver with life.  That was
because I  saw everything with the strange,  new sight that had come to me.  On
entering the door I remembered the doll I had broken. I felt my way to the hearth
and picked up the pieces. I tried vainly to put them together. Then my eyes filled
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with tears; for I realized what I had done, and for the first time I felt repentance
and sorrow. (Keller 1996, chapter four)
40 Her phrases are telling. Everything had a name, which means has a name for us, for you as
well as me. It means you and I can think the same thing and recognize that fact. That is
joint intentionality enhanced by the mechanism of language. And each name gave birth to
a new thought, which means the something outside me, by having a sign to refer to it
and distinguish it, is also at the same time a thought in my mind, something I internally
“handle.” The object is mine in a new way. Every object which I touched seemed to quiver
with  life.  Whatever  that  packed  phrase  can  tell  us,  it  must  at  least  mean  that  the
perceptual  experience  of  the  thing  was  now  supplemented  with  a  new  emotional
significance, perhaps because potentially shared by self and other. The word drapes the
object with the emotional charge of joint intentionality. For the first time I felt repentance
and sorrow. Only now is the doll a gift from another that mattered to you and I. But this
brings sorrow too: eating of the fruit of the tree of language gives us meanings, but not
only happy meanings. Feelings, good and bad, are now more intense. The acquisition of
the linguistic ability to manipulate possibilities that are shared with another, to know
one  and  the  other  are  thinking  the  same  thing,  has  altered  everything.  Whatever
happens to the self is now a proto-social experience; language embeds a social tool in
an already, or developing, joint intentional human self-consciousness. But there is final
step in human evolution to which Mead can contribute.
 
II.3. Culture
41 It currently appears that culture,  behavioral modernity, arrived for Homo sapiens,  80-
50.000 years ago, during what some call the “Great Leap Forward” (Diamond 1999).3
This includes some kinds of art, decoration, burial rituals, and more complex tools. It
was only after this that Homo sapiens outcompeted and outlasted all other hominins,
perhaps involving a greater ability to adapt to novel climate change in virtually any
environment. At any rate, the combination of both complex verbal language, enabling
the handling of meanings, and their exemplification in cultural products, based on and
refinements of joint intentionality, was fully in place at that time.
42 Some  claim  culture  is  not  uniquely  human.  This  is  because  some  scientists  define
culture as learning passed across generations by a local population of a species, which
is rare enough. Populations of an animal species are not especially different in their
behavior;  individual  learning  is  not  passed  on  genetically.  There  a  few  nonhuman
populations that seem to have done this. One of the most famous cases is a troop of
macaques, a kind of snow monkey, in Koshima, Japan who alone among their species
wash their sweet potatoes in saltwater before eating them, and teach their offspring
this behavior. Some scientists call this “culture.” 
43 But we must distinguish culture from society. A society is a group of conspecifics who
live  together  and  are  interdependent  so  that  belonging  to  the  society  makes  a
difference  to  individual  behavior.  That  is  to  say,  the  emergent  social  processes
downwardly  influence  the  traits  of  the  individuals  involved.  In  intelligent  species
society may entail rules of behavioral propriety and intelligibility. But culture is not
society,  it  is  something  society  produces and  possesses.  If  society  and  culture  were
identical, no society could exhibit cultural change – it would no longer be the same
society – and we would have to deny the existence of “multicultural” societies, societies
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with more than one culture. When the macaques acquire potato washing their society
has indeed changed, and they have passed on social learning across generations. 
44 Culture,  I  suggest,  is  different.  It  is  making things that  mean,  or more elaborately:  a)
constructing practices, artifacts, and narratives; b) that are valued intrinsically, as ends
in themselves; c) which realize shared meanings; d) in terms of which individual life,
society, and the world are valued and understood (Cahoone 2005). Culture emerges only
in human societies. The beaver dam and termite mound are social products. So is the
hominin hand-axe and bow. But the cave paintings of Lascaux, or the ornamentation of
bodies  and  clothing,  ritual  dances,  and  narratives  told  around  the  campfire,  are
different additions to reality: they are valued in so far as they mean something that
contributes to members’ orientation in the world. 
45 In terms of Figure One, culture is clearly a social product, a product of the We. But it
presents a new interpretive environment for the understanding and valuation of the
world (or X), the I and You, and the We itself. Humans came to root their social order in
a  dimension  of  intrinsically  valued,  made  icons,  myths,  and  rituals.  This  doubtless
added  to  the  already  existing  social  bond.  As  Tomasello  argues,  the  cultural  era
develops what sociologist Emile Durkheim called “group mind.” For Tomasello culture
provides a second step in human cognitive and social evolution, beyond the “second
personal”  collaboration  and morality  of  earlier  hominins.  It  provides  an  “objective
morality” normative for  the social  group.  He and others  regard this  as  above all  a
reinforcement of human “groupishness” (Haidt 2013).
46 But while culture does intensify the social bond, that is a result of the different kind of
bond it  is.  For the first  time on Earth,  things now mean something more than the
direction of game, the likelihood of water-containing roots, the coming of storms. They
now mean what the world is and how we fit into it. For the first time some “thing” – not
a human – is intrinsically valuable because of its meaning, rather than being edible,
desirable or pleasurable. Intrinsically valuable things have now been created in terms of
them much of the world is understood as meaningful for human life. Now a totemic
animal embodies the spirit of me and my ancestors. The stars depict human scenes. My
life and death take place in a normative circle of the four winds. My fertility is now
connected to the order of the world, the circulation of manna and power and value, by
a ritual or totem explained in a narrative. 
47 Mead devoted little time to the analysis of culture, but his semiotic understanding of
the  human  mind  lays  the  basis  for  the  recognition  that  the  dimension  of  cultural
symbol provides the representation of the background context of reality and human
goals. Only with culture do the uniquely social and linguistic animals we call human
organize  their  lives  according  to  a  cognitive  and  affective  understanding  of  the
nonhuman world,  and so  the  place  of  their  society  in  it.  As  Ernest  Gellner  argued
regarding  hunter-gatherer  societies,  “We cooperate  because  we  think  alike  and we




48 What then did Mead contribute to the current understanding of the emergence of the
joint intentional self? 
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49 First,  the  notion that  language,  and other  widely  recognized human activities,  like
morality, tool-making, and reason, are themselves dependent on the more fundamental
social nature of the human mind and self, the ability to take the perspective of the other
and  thereby  switch  perspectives.  Thought  is  internal  dialogue  and  the  self  is
constituted by such dialogue. Language and culture are rooted in this capacity. The
recent  notion of  shared or  joint  intentionality  is  an extension of  this  concept.  The
human individual’s experience is social and cultural. 
50 Second,  the  emergence  of  these  uniquely  human  processes,  like  all  emergence,  is
rooted in the ability of something to be “several things at once,” meaning, to function
in alternate contexts or processes. This is a feature of many systems in nature, which
can function in different orders or scales. The emergence of novel modes of functioning
in nature are normally due to environmental changes. But once the human self has
arisen, something exists which is uniquely capable of switching perspectives itself, of
taking  on  other  roles,  and  communicating  among  them.  At  the  same  time,  Mead
recognized that emergence, and with it the reality of formal and final causation, does
not mean an opposition to mechanism or reduction. The complex functioning system,
which has “emerged,” remains simultaneously a collection of less complex components
obeying mechanical processes, and a complex component of higher level, often telic,
processes. The mistake is to believe one strategy of explanation excludes the others. 
51 Mead’s thought is alive and well, and at the center of contemporary attempts to bring
together the natural and social sciences in understanding the human difference.
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NOTES
1. While  in  Experience  and  Nature (1958,  Ch. 7)  Dewey  distinguished  evolutionary  “levels”  –
inanimate,  animate,  psycho-physical  (animal),  and  mental  (human),  he  specifically  denied
emergence  in  his  letters to  Bentley  in  1945  (Dewey & Bentley  1964).  He  disliked  the  term’s
“irrelevant doctrinal associations,” writing that “‘Emergent Evolution’ […] seems to be a doctrine
and a rather absurd one” (ibid.: 403). He criticized the notion of “levels of organization,” saying,
“I came near falling for it […].” He includes some ridicule: emergence as a “miracle” to jump up
such levels, like a “series of elevators.” “John and Susan [?] rise from the ocean […] They had […]
to submerge, before they could emerge.” His explanation of his own resistance: “A prejudice I
couldn’t overcome, I guess, against any feudalism with its fixed hierarchy of lowers and highers.”
(Ibid.: 426-7).
2. Unfortunately this issue,  whether nonhumans possess “selves,” has become moralized and
even politicized. Unless we are to hold nonhumans responsible to human norms, we cannot say
they  possess  all  traits  and  capabilities  we  do.  Every  species  is  different  and
anthropomorphization does none any favor. Nor is similarity to ourselves the only reason to
value or respect a creature. The absence of a “self” is not tantamount to absence of value. We
may value nonhumans precisely in their difference from us. 
3. Tomasello suggests that joint intentionality was first evident in Homo Heidelbergensis 400.000
years  ago,  and was then shared by Neanderthals  and Homo sapiens,  while  culture arose later
among our species alone (Tomasello 2014, 2016). This area of research is in flux. But I would
suggest the following. Homo erectus, from which Heidelbergensis probably arose, with double the
brain size of earlier hominins, seems to have spread across the entirety of the old world from
Africa and to have controlled fire. Those are remarkable advances; whether they were based in
joint intentionality is unclear. It may be that language, initially manual but later verbal, evolved
for a very long time, and was characteristic of all these advanced hominins in some form, as well
as Homo neanderthalis, with as large a brain as ourselves. As for artifactural culture, there is some
evidence for it  among Neanderthals,  but as yet not the volume or kind of creations as Homo
sapiens in the past 100.000 years or so. 
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ABSTRACTS
What is the core of the distinctiveness of Homo sapiens? Some of the most famous hypotheses
include tool use and tool making, language, free will and moral agency, self-consciousness, mind
itself, and reason or rational problem-solving. All these answers are partly true. But recent work
in comparative psychology, primatology, and cognitive science have converged on a conception
of human distinctiveness that underlies these. Remarkably, it  was explored a century ago by
George Herbert Mead. The American pragmatists played a special role in the development of
non-reductive naturalism. But among them, Mead uniquely endorsed the notion of “emergence”
developed by the  British  Emergentists.  This  led  him to  an analysis  of  the  emergence of  the
human  self  and  mind  out  of  social  processes,  most  famously  employing  his  concept  of
“significant gesture.” In recent decades both notions have been buttressed by philosophical and
scientific work. Emergence has returned in the sciences of nonlinear dynamics and complexity,
and has been re-conceptualized by philosophers like Wiliiam Wimsatt. Mead’s social conception
of  the  human  mind  and  self  have  been  repurposed  by  a  host  of  scientists,  as  in  Michael
Tomasello’s  conception  of  “joint  intentionality”  and  Antonio  Damasio’s  analysis  of  self-
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